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Abstract 
Environmental governance in Northern Ireland has been highly problematic and the subject of intense 
criticism. Since the collapse of the devolved government in January 2017, environmental policy 
development and urgently needed processes of environmental governance reform have stagnated. 
Combined with the continuing uncertainty surrounding Brexit, this situation has the potential to 
exacerbate an already challenging governance context and the severe environmental consequences of 
political inaction are already becoming clear. This article will reflect on how future environmental 
governance arrangements in Northern Ireland might develop in light of both distinctive local challenges 
and reforms that have been proposed for other parts of the UK post-Brexit. Its central theme is the 
potential for the distinctive environmental governance vulnerabilities present in Northern Ireland to be 
compounded by Brexit. It concludes that a process of reform centred on the development of common 
frameworks, underpinned by environmental objectives, principles, rights and duties and enforced via 
meaningful accountability mechanisms would help strengthen environmental protection even where the 
political will or power is lacking. Such a process of reform could help address both existing 
environmental problems and potential environmental governance gaps posed by Brexit, as well as 
providing valuable lessons for other jurisdictions facing major environmental governance reform or 
contending with the practical implications of governance without a functioning government. 
 
1. Introduction 
Brexit and the on-going debates surrounding the border on the island of Ireland have placed a spotlight 
on Northern Ireland, its complex politics and its fraught structures and systems of government.1 With 
                                                          
1 An unprecedented level of academic attention has focused on the political and legal complexities of Northern Ireland and 
Brexit. See for example, C. Murray, S. de Mars, A. O’Donoghue and B. Warwick, Bordering two unions: Northern Ireland 
and Brexit (Bristol University Press, 2018); M.C. Murphy, Europe and Northern Ireland’s Future (Agenda Publishing, 2018). 
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concerted political, public and media attention suddenly scrutinising the performance of the devolved 
government, environmental governance is emerging as an area replete with both historical and on-going 
failures. Strikingly, despite almost three decades of sustained criticism and numerous, detailed 
proposals for reform,2 many of the problems identified in scrutiny reports written as far back as 1990 
persist today. Recurrent themes include delayed modernisation of environmental legislation and policy, 
failure to implement environmental law and policy in practice, failure to take meaningful enforcement 
action in the face of serious non-compliance with environmental law, the post-hoc granting of 
permissions for on-going illegal activities, a lack of transparency and accountability and an unaddressed 
risk of political interference in environmental decision-making.3 Recent years have also seen significant 
public scandals surrounding environmental governance failures. The most prominent of these has been 
the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) debacle. This involved the alleged manipulation of green energy 
subsidies (designed to promote the uptake of wood-pellet burning boilers) for profit at the cost of an 
estimated £490 million to the Northern Ireland taxpayer and has resulted in the ‘death of the green 
energy industry in Northern Ireland’.4 Other recent examples include the discovery of one of Europe’s 
biggest illegal dumps (known as the ‘Mobuoy Superdump’),5 a complete failure to implement testing 
for diesel emissions for the last twelve years6 and the granting of retrospective permissions for hugely 
damaging illegal sand and gravel extraction from Lough Neagh, one of Northern Ireland’s most 
internationally significant nature conservation sites.7 An emerging scandal relating to the granting of 
                                                          
On-going research projects examining this issue include the Economic and Social Research Council funded Brexit Law NI, 
https://brexitlawni.org. 
2 The first detailed investigation into environmental issues in Northern Ireland was undertaken by the House of Commons 
Select Committee on the Environment and highlighted major problems across almost all aspects of environmental governance. 
House of Commons Environment Committee, ‘Environmental Issues in Northern Ireland’ HC (1990-91) 39 (London: HMSO), 
(the ‘Rossi’ Report). This was followed by a series of reports from a range of scrutiny bodies, including: Northern Ireland 
Audit Office (NIAO), Control of River Pollution in Northern Ireland (HC 1997–98, 693); NIAO, Areas of Special Scientific 
Interest (HC 2003–2004, 499); NIAO, Northern Ireland’s Waste Management Strategy (HC 2005–06, 88); House of Commons 
NIAC, Waste Management Strategy in Northern Ireland (HC 2004–05, 349-I); Northern Ireland Assembly PAC, Control of 
River Pollution in Northern Ireland (Third Report 2001) http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/public/reports/report3-00r.htm; 
Criminal Justice Inspection (CJI), Enforcement in the Department of the Environment (2007) 
<www.cjini.org/getattachment/6e35e56d-68e5-41d3-b099-c33586abf0dd/Enforcement-in-the-Department-of-
Environment.aspx>; CJI, Enforcement in the Department of the Environment Northern Ireland: A Follow Up Review of 
Inspection Recommendations (2011) <www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/d7/d71473bc-2dc9-4ff5-b957-d410ff851852.pdf> 9; CJI, A 
Review of the Northern Ireland Environment Agency’s Environmental Crime Unit (2015) < 
www.cjini.org/getattachment/776ee5fc-b3c0-4759-8fbe-18a72a8f31e5/A-review-of-the-Northern-Ireland-Environment-
Agenc.aspx> 35. Overarching independent reviews have also been undertaken, notably R. Macrory, Transparency and Trust: 
Reshaping Environmental Governance in Northern Ireland (UCL Press, 2004); T. Burke, G. Bell and S. Turner, Foundations 
for the Future: The Review of Environmental Governance (2007) www.ukela.org/content/doclib/135.pdf; and more recently 
R. Purdy and P. Hjerp, Review of Environmental Governance in Northern Ireland (2016) 
https://www.nienvironmentlink.org/cmsfiles/Environmental-Governance-NI-Ecocentric-Final-Report-2016.pdf. 
3 C. Brennan, R. Purdy and P. Hjerp ‘Political, economic and environmental crisis in Northern Ireland: the true cost of 
environmental governance failures and opportunities for reform’ (2017) 68(2) NILQ 123. 
4 T. Muinzer, ‘Incendiary Developments: Northern Ireland’s Renewable Heat Incentive and the Collapse of the Devolved 
Government’ (March/April 2017) 99 UKELA E-Law 18. The RHI Inquiry chaired by Rt Hon Sir Patrick Coghlin is due to 
report in 2019, https://www.rhiinquiry.org. 
5 C. Mills, A Review of Waste Disposal at the Mobuoy Site and the Lessons Learnt for the Future Regulation of the Waste 
Industry in Northern Ireland (Mills Report, DOE 2013); and C. Brennan, ‘The Enforcement of Waste Regulation in Northern 
Ireland: Deterrence, Dumping and the Dynamics of Devolution’ (2016) 28(3) JEL 471. 
6 C. Spackman and G. Grandjean, ‘MOT diesel test not performed in NI for 12 years’ (BBC, 26 September 2018), 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-45643031. 
7 C. Macauley, ‘Lough Neagh sand-dredging: Minister 'wrong'’ (BBC, 28 June 2017), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
northern-ireland-40429162. 
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subsidies for anaerobic digesters threatens to dwarf even the RHI debacle in terms of potential fraud 
and manipulation of green energy schemes and is now the subject of an investigation by the Northern 
Ireland Audit Office.8 Notwithstanding the astounding extent of these governance failures, the devolved 
government has been unwilling or unable to change the trajectory of problematic environmental 
decision-making despite constant reminders from environmental pressure groups and an extensive 
range of official scrutiny reports.9  
While these well-documented failures pose a significant risk of serious, irreversible consequences for 
the environment (Northern Ireland’s and beyond), they now also have the potential to be amplified and 
exacerbated dependent on the nature of Brexit. Currently environmental governance is based on a 
system of multilevel governance,10 with shared competence between the EU and the individual Member 
States and, via devolution, thereby Northern Ireland. The EU provides a substantial body of 
environmental law, including minimum standards and approaches that Northern Ireland may build 
upon. It also supports a wide range of important governance functions, such as the formulation of new 
policy – from setting long-term objectives to developing specific standards – to the evaluation of 
existing ones,11 as well as critical enforcement and accountability functions.12 The EU has therefore 
provided the foundations for environmental governance across the UK, including in Northern Ireland. 
These foundations are now threatened by Brexit, which may lead to a patchy legal system and 
considerable governance gaps.13 In light of Northern Ireland’s already problematic experience, this has 
the potential to undermine the entire governance system - with profound consequences for Northern 
Ireland’s environment. In addition, the potential risk of increased regulatory divergence north and south 
of the Irish border also poses serious political problems for the UK as a whole. On the one hand, the 
cost of managing a degraded environment and its consequences has the potential to be economically 
crippling.14 On the other hand, the impact of substandard governance performance in the context of the 
environment may also influence success in terms of negotiating (or delivering on) an EU exit deal, 
especially given the potential impacts on cross-border trade and the need for maintenance of a level 
playing field with the Republic of Ireland and beyond.15 The fact that the ‘backstop’ and the importance 
of preventing the UK gaining a competitive advantage through the potential reduction of environmental 
                                                          
8 C. Macauley, ‘Auditor calls for an investigation into anaerobic digester subsidies’ (BBC, 15 November 2018), 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-46213976 and C. Macauley, ‘Top NI auditor to investigate over green energy 
scheme claims’ (BBC, 21 December 2018)  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-46650410  
9 For a summary of the findings of these scrutiny reports see Brennan et al, n.3. 
10 On EU multilevel governance generally, see: L. Hooghe and G. Marks, Multi-level Governance and European Integration 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 
11 A. Jordan, C. Burns, V. Gravey (2017) ‘Three Brexit governance gaps no one is talking about’, 
https://greenallianceblog.org.uk/2017/12/06/three-brexit-governance-gaps-no-one-is-talking-about/. 
12 M. Lee, ‘Accountability for Environmental Standards after Brexit’, (2017) 19(2) ELR 89. 
13 M. Lee, ‘Brexit and environmental protection in the United Kingdom: governance, accountability and law making’, (2018) 
36(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 351. 
14 Brennan et al, n.3. 
15 C. Brennan, M. Dobbs, V. Gravey and A. Uí Bhroin, Policy Paper: The Future of Environmental Governance in Northern 
Ireland, (July, 2018) https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2018/07/Environmental-
Governance-in-NI-Policy-Paper-final-V3.pdf.  
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standards post-Brexit have occupied such a prominent place in the on-going Brexit negotiations is 
testament to the gravity that should be afforded to these issues.16 Northern Ireland environmental 
governance failure must therefore be addressed not merely for its own enhancement, but also in light of 
its broader impacts.  
However, Northern Ireland is now caught between the pincers of an uncertain and chaotic Brexit process 
and the complete collapse of the devolved government and power-sharing arrangements. No clear 
political leadership can be identified and Northern Irish policy and law-making has stagnated. As a 
consequence, the environmental governance reforms that have been sought repeatedly in Northern 
Ireland, and which remain necessary, are now unlikely in the foreseeable future.17 There is thus an 
urgent need for specific environmental governance mechanisms that will not only help remedy the 
legacy of decades of environmental neglect, but also copper-fasten Northern Irish environmental 
governance in the context of likely future political vacuums or where competing objectives threaten 
environmental protection. This article investigates the unique environmental governance vulnerabilities 
emerging in Northern Ireland in the wake of the UK’s decision to leave the EU and in light of the 
volatile devolved political context, and potential means to address these. It will firstly explore the 
governance implications of the current decision-making vacuum which has been triggered by the 
collapse of the devolved government. It will then highlight distinctive aspects of the existing system 
which make the already-problematic governance of the environment in Northern Ireland much more 
vulnerable to the political volatility and uncertainty created by Brexit. Finally, this article will consider 
three key issues which will be central to any future reforms designed to address such challenges. the 
need to develop common frameworks which establish and maintain formal environmental governance 
cooperation and minimal environmental standards and approaches both on the island of Ireland and 
with Great Britain (GB) the need to enshrine environmental principles (and related concepts) preferably 
within these frameworks or in a separate instrument such as an overarching environmental charter, and 
the vital importance of developing robust enforcement and accountability mechanisms. Unless 
meaningful reform is undertaken as a matter of urgency, environmental governance failures will not 
only result in continued environmental degradation, but will persist in creating significant economic 
risks and  political challenges  for decades to come. 
2. Decision-making in a political vacuum 
A central consideration for Northern Ireland’s governance of any issue must be the collapse of the 
devolved government January 2017, with the subsequent lack of political power to legislate or make 
policy decisions. It is fitting that, given the apathy shown towards environmental governance by some 
                                                          
16 European Commission, Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators' level on 14 November 2018, 
(2018) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_agreement_0.pdf.  
17 Despite numerous attempts to restore the devolved government, at the time of writing talks processes have failed. 
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political parties within Northern Ireland, it was the failure of the then First Minister (Arlene Foster, 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)) to step down pending a full investigation into her role in the scandal 
surrounding the mismanagement of the RHI green energy scheme which prompted the resignation of 
the late Deputy First Minister (Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein) and the consequent collapse of the 
Executive.18 Although RHI was the ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’,19 the scandal emerged at a time 
of increasing political tensions surrounding the Irish language, marriage equality and fundamental 
differences in opinion relating to Brexit and the DUP’s support for the Leave campaign in the EU 
referendum. The difficult task of re-establishing any degree of trust between the main political parties 
and restarting the Executive has been massively complicated by Brexit, the DUP’s on-going (albeit 
tenuous) confidence and supply arrangement with the Conservative government and disputes 
surrounding the future nature of the Irish border.20 In the long term, this raises significant questions 
about the governability and sustainability of Northern Ireland as a political entity. In the short term, 
important decision-making processes – including those regarding the environment – have essentially 
ground to a halt. Given the abysmal environmental record of the devolved government, its collapse may 
not, prima facie, appear to be any great loss to environmental protection efforts. However, the day-to-
day realities of the almost record-breaking period of time without a functioning government are stark, 
and extend far beyond environmental governance to (for example) health, education, reparations for 
historical victims of abuse, development of the North-South electricity interconnector, investment, 
transport, and public appointments.21 In the context of the environment however, three key, and 
increasingly controversial examples stand out and have proven pivotal in unpicking the practical 
implications of governance without a government. These scenarios, respectively, demonstrate the 
limitations of civil service powers, the difficulties posed by piecemeal or delayed action/inaction and 
the consequences of hesitancy in preparing for Brexit. 
The first example relates to the on-going saga of a £240 million waste incinerator, which was designed 
to plug a very significant gap in Northern Ireland’s waste disposal strategy but which ran into substantial 
opposition from both environmental groups and residents of Mallusk, Co. Antrim where it was due to 
be installed.22 Aside from the clearly problematic environmental consequences of either granting or not 
granting planning permission for the installation of the incineration facility, the decision-making 
process and how the courts have responded in the consequent appeals have had much wider 
                                                          
18 The joint nature of the Office of First and Deputy First Minister (OFDFM) means the resignation of either First or Deputy 
First Minister will result in the de facto collapse of the devolved government. 
19 C. Page, ‘Stormont: All you need to know about NI’s latest political crisis’, (BBC, 16 January 2017), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38612860. 
20 E.g. J. Stone, ‘Brexit causes surge in support for united Ireland, poll finds’, (The Independent, June 2018), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-united-ireland-referendum-northern-border-uk-yougov-poll-
a8389086.html. 
21 G. Moriarty, ‘Northern Ireland on verge of new world record – for no government’ (Irish Times, 7 August 2018) 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/northern-ireland-on-verge-of-new-world-record-for-no-government-1.3587841. 
22 G. McKeown, ‘New report casts doubt on need for £240m Co Antrim incinerator facility’, (Irish News, 27 April 2018), 
http://www.irishnews.com/business/2018/04/27/news/new-report-casts-doubt-on-need-for-240m-co-antrim-incinerator-
facility-1315063. 
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implications.23 The upshot of the Court of Appeal’s ruling that civil servant decision-making in the 
incinerator case was unlawful in the absence of a minister, was ultimately to lead to the creation of 
legislation temporarily enabling individual senior civil servants to make decisions in the public interest 
and also to pushing back the requirement to hold Assembly elections until at least 26th March 2019.24 
This clearly has very significant consequences in the context of a contentious shift away from a 
devolved government towards potentially UK direct rule. However, the new legislation does little to fill 
an increasingly yawning gap in accountability for decision-making in Northern Ireland. Nor does it 
facilitate substantive policy or legislative changes, both of which are necessary now – especially in the 
context of the environment. 
The second issue is clearly highlighted via the management of the illegal ‘superdump’ discovered at 
Mobuoy in 2015.25 Created by individuals operating behind a mask of legitimacy in a licensed recycling 
facility, the dump is in close proximity to the River Faughan (a tributary of the River Foyle, which 
supplies drinking water to the surrounding area) and is either adjacent to or within numerous designated 
nature conservation sites – notably the River Faughan and Tributaries Special Area of Conservation 
(SAC).26 It has been estimated that approximately a million cubic metres of waste has been illegally 
disposed of at the Mobuoy Road site, equivalent to filling around four hundred Olympic-sized 
swimming pools.27 The inaction on beginning site remediation due to decision-making paralysis is now 
actually creating further environmental risks and potentially increasing existing levels of 
contamination.28 Additionally, the complications created by the delays to political decision-making are 
now snowballing. The prosecutions for the dumping itself are yet to be scheduled. There is on-going 
legal wrangling about an enforcement notice forcing the removal of waste issued by the Planning 
Appeals Commission and there is also a civil suit being brought by one affected landowner.29 Northern 
Ireland’s failure to regulate the waste sector in general is also currently subject of an infraction 
complaint made by Friends of the Earth NI to the European Commission.30 This fiasco not only 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 The Court of Appeal case took place in July 2018; see Buick's (Colin) Application as Chair Person of NOARC 21, [2018] 
NICA 26. In October 2018, the UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Karen Bradley) introduced the Northern Ireland 
(Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) Act 2018 to the House of Commons and subsequently came into force on 
the 1st November 2018. In January 2019, the UK Supreme Court in Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland 
of devolution issues to the Supreme Court pursuant to Paragraph 34 of Schedule 10 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (No 2) 
(Northern Ireland) [2019] UKSC 1 decided that the issues raised in the Arc21 incinerator ruling case should be handled in the 
North-South electricity connector case, which was heard before Belfast High Court in February 2019. The High Court decided 
that the decision to grant approval for the North-South Interconnector in the absence of a minister was wrong. 
25 See Mills, n.5 and DAERA, n.d. The Mobuoy Road Waste Project, https://www.daera-ni.gov.uk/articles/mobuoy-road-
waste-project. 
26 Green Party NI, ‘Drinking water fears a reminder that Mobuoy dangers remain’, 30 September 2017, 
http://www.greenpartyni.org/drinking-water-fears-a-reminder-that-mobuoy-dangers-remain. See also 
http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/protectedsites/sacselection/sac.asp?EUcode=UK0030361 for details on the features which have led to 
the Special Area of Conservation designation. 
27 DAERA, n.d., n.25. 
28 C. McAuley ‘Government's 'lack of joined up thinking' on illegal dump criticised’, (BBC, 27 October 2017) 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-41775317.  
29 Ibid. See Planning Appeal Commission (PAC) References 2015/E0050 and 2015/E0052. 
30 Friends of the Earth (FoE) have confirmed that infraction cases have been initiated by the Commission against the UK in 
relation to Northern Ireland but have not reached any formal litigation stage.  Further complaints have also been made by FoE 
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demonstrates the real environmental harm that can arise from an absence of proper decision-making 
processes, but is also a direct consequence of decades of weak enforcement of environmental law and 
a lack of political leadership in pushing for reforms that might curb the extent of this weakness.  
The third key issue relates directly to Northern Ireland’s preparations (or lack thereof) for environmental 
governance post-Brexit – which contrasts starkly with processes currently being undertaken in other 
parts of the UK and in the Republic of Ireland.31 There has been some significant civil service activity, 
e.g. the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) has worked with their 
counterparts across the UK and politicians in Westminster and has set up four stakeholders groups on 
rural affairs, agriculture and trade, environment and fisheries – and these groups have persisted after 
the collapse of Northern Ireland’s Executive.32 Bringing together a wide variety of stakeholders, these 
groups have worked with DAERA on identifying policy priorities (sent to the Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in London) and in some cases developing more detailed 
plans.33 However, this activity has, until now, primarily focused on agriculture, and aspects of 
environmental governance with direct links to agriculture. For example, DAERA finally caught up with 
Wales, Scotland and England in organising an informal consultation (a public engagement) on its 
proposals for a future agricultural policy framework in August 2018 and publish the resulting 
document.34 However, even this occurred only after considerable pressures from stakeholders and 
Westminster to publish the document.35 While detailed plans have been produced for how 
environmental governance might look in Scotland, England and Wales (dependant on the EU exit deal), 
no equivalent processes have (thus far) been undertaken in Northern Ireland.36 This creates a significant 
risk that Northern Ireland will simply ‘copy over’ arrangements made for England, which will, by their 
very nature, not be tailored to the distinctive challenges faced in this jurisdiction.37 Fundamentally, there 
                                                          
in relation to breaches regarding nitrates and ammonia in autumn 2018. Email from James Orr, Director of Friends of the Earth 
Northern Ireland, 20 February 2019.  
31 E.g. Scottish Government, Environmental Governance in Scotland on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, May 2018, 
https://www.gov.scot/Publications/2018/06/2221/6; National Assembly for Wales, CCERA Committee, Environmental 
governance arrangements and environmental principles post-Brexit, June 2018, 
http://www.assembly.wales/laid%20documents/cr-ld11622/cr-ld11622-e.pdf; DEFRA, Environmental Principles and 
Governance after EU Exit, consultation, May 2018, https://consult.defra.gov.uk/eu/environmental-principles-and-governance; 
Department of the Taoiseach, Ireland, Government Statement on Brexit Preparations, 
https://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/News/Government_Press_Releases/Government_Statement_on_Brexit_Preparations.html 
and Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2019, No.14 of 2019, 
https://www.dfa.ie/brexit/getting-ireland-brexit-ready/governmentcontingencyactionplan/ and 
https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/eu/brexit/brexitcontingency/No-Deal-Brexit-Contingency-Action-Plan-December-18.pdf  
32 DAERA, Northern Ireland Future Agricultural Policy Framework: Stakeholder Engagement, 1st August 2018, section 1.2.1, 
https://www.daera-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/consultations/daera/NI%20Future%20Agricultural%20Policy%20Framework%20-
%20Stakeholder%20Engagement%20-%20FINAL_0.pdf. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 E.g. this was a central topic of discussion in the oral evidence by Wes Aston, Mary Dobbs and Viviane Gravey in Northern 
Ireland Affairs Committee (NIAC), Oral evidence: Brexit and Northern Ireland: Agriculture, HC 939 6 June 2018 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/northern-ireland-affairs-
committee/brexit-and-northern-ireland-agriculture/oral/84884.html. 
36 DAERA, n.32. 
37 Historically, there is a well-known and problematic practice of directly replicating Westminster’s environmental legislation 
into Northern Irish environmental law with minimal local input. Brennan et al, n.3, 133. Examples are already beginning to 
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has been little or no formal consideration of what the implications will be for Northern Ireland 
environmental law and governance should the EU frameworks, principles and accountability 
mechanisms no longer apply. Coupled with Northern Ireland’s legacy of environmental neglect and a 
complete absence of devolved decision-making, Northern Ireland is now particularly vulnerable to 
Brexit and without the ability to respond internally to the urgent need for reformed domestic policies, 
legislation and governance structures. 
3. Brexit-related risks and vulnerabilities 
3.1 ‘Taking back control’ of environmental governance 
While the repatriation of competences from the EU was a key tenet of the Vote Leave campaign, the 
task of ‘taking back control’ of inherently intertwined areas such as the environment (to whatever degree 
a final EU exit deal might allow) is incredibly complex38 – both at an EU and internal UK level. This 
has been clearly reflected in the on-going debates over the EU Withdrawal Agreement and UK common 
frameworks.39 Central questions relevant across all four UK jurisdictions include the extent to which 
control should be kept in Westminster vis-à-vis the devolved administrations; the extent to which 
control should be kept in the four executives vis-à-vis their legislatures and vis-à-vis stakeholders; and 
finally the extent to which international cooperation can be pursued – an issue which is clearly 
particularly relevant to the need to address shared challenges on the island of Ireland. Taking back 
control is thus not only reshaping the UK’s relationship with the EU, but also questioning UK 
constitutional dynamics, in particular intra-UK intergovernmental relations.40 There are now serious 
questions about how Brexit will thus affect a predominantly devolved issue like the environment, 
particularly in light of the removal of existing EU common frameworks (i.e. the EU environmental 
acquis, common to all EU Member States). There is the need to respect the devolution agreements, 
however this must be balanced against the risk of facilitating too great a degree of legal and regulatory 
divergence – and especially enabling divergence ‘downwards’ from existing environmental standards. 
                                                          
emerge which clearly illustrate this risk, e.g. proposed changes to the Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations 
(Northern Ireland) 1995 (as amended), undertaken via Westminster in the absence of a devolved government largely replicate 
those proposed for England and Wales. However, because Northern Ireland does not have a regulator independent of a central 
government department, changes that seem relatively innocuous may create potentially serious conflicts of interest and imbue 
the NIEA with significantly more discretion in relation to environmental decision-making than regulators in England, Scotland 
or Wales. This is discussed infra in section 4.3. 
38 M. Sandford and C. Gormley-Heenan, ‘’Taking Back Control’, the UK’s Constitutional Narrative and Scrhodinger’s 
Devolution’, (2018) Parliamentary Affairs 1. 
39 Ibid. Also, e.g. A. Paun, ‘Common UK Frameworks after Brexit’, SPICe Briefing 18-09, 2nd February 2019, https://sp-bpr-
en-prod-cdnep.azureedge.net/published/2018/2/2/Common-UK-Frameworks-after-Brexit/SB%2018-09.pdf; V. Gravey and 
C. Reid, ‘Taking back and sharing control? Brexit and the common environmental frameworks’, Brexit and Environment, 12th 
March 2018, https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/2018/03/12/common-environmental-frameworks; and T. Eddington, 
‘Brexit: What do Theresa May’s Tory enemies object to in the deal?’, (BBC News, 16th November 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-46214526. 
40 R. Minto et al ‘A Changing UK in a Changing Europe: The UK State between European Union and Devolution’, (2016) 
87(2) Political Quarterly, 179; and The Centre for Cross-border Studies, Briefing Paper 5: The Impact of Brexit on Devolution 
in Northern Ireland (2018) http://crossborder.ie/site2015/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Devolution-Briefing-Paper-Final-
2.pdf.  
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Dealing with the devolved governments can still be considered a relatively new phenomenon for the 
UK government. Following devolution in the late 1990s, the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) was 
established as a forum to bring together all four governments –– but it remained a weak institution with 
no statutory underpinning, no formal decision-making power, or fixed schedule, meaning that ‘the 
effectiveness of the JMC is very much open to question’.41 Most formations of the JMC have fallen into 
disuse – with the notable exception of the JMC Europe, which met regularly ahead of Council of the 
EU meetings to discuss areas of EU decision-making impacting on devolved competence.42 Instead, 
intergovernmental relations within the UK have been mainly bilateral, government to government 
instead of four UK nations together, and mainly mundane, happening ’below the political radar, as 
officials deal with day-to-day matters’.43 This can be attributed to a number of factors including political 
congruence within GB until 2007 (under Labour majorities) and a focus within Northern Ireland on 
maintaining the fragile government structures set up under the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement44 
(GFBA).45  Even despite ten years of political incongruence in GB post-2007 and very limited 
institutional cooperation, UK intergovernmental relations were, until the mid-2010s characterised by 
very little conflict. Beyond the humdrum of frequent, official-to-official interactions, conflicts were also 
limited due to party political strategies – on the one hand, the Welsh and Scottish nationalists sought to 
‘build up a benign reputation for collaborative government’46 and, once in power the Conservative Party 
sought not to stress their limited or non-existent roots in the devolved nations. Hence, it has been argued 
that ‘neither the UK government nor the devolved governments have seen political benefits in a path 
that priorities conflict over cooperation in the intergovernmental arena’.47  
However, this apparent lack of conflict on a political level coexisted with a deepening of policy 
divergence across the four nations, especially in areas of Europeanised competence. In policy areas 
such as agriculture or the environment, ‘the EU dimension provide[d] a structure of opportunities to 
embed and develop institutional and policy competencies in the case of devolved government’.48 
Ambitious governments in Wales and Scotland seized this opportunity to go beyond the EU baseline – 
in waste management and renewable energy respectively – while Northern Ireland did not.49 Instead, as 
                                                          
41 J. Hunt & R. Minto, ‘Between intergovernmental relations and paradiplomacy: Wales and the Brexit of the regions’, (2017) 
19(4) British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 647 at 650. 
42 Institute for Government, Devolution after Brexit, April 2018, 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IFGJ6070-Devoution-After-Brexit-180406-
FINAL-WEB-FINAL.pdf. 
43 J. Gallagher, ‘Intergovernmental Relations in the UK: Co-operation, Competition and Constitutional Change’, (2012) 14(2) 
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 198 at 200.  
44 Ibid. 
45 The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, 1998, https://peacemaker.un.org/uk-ireland-good-friday98. 
46 R. Parry, ‘The Civil Service and Intergovernmental Relations in the Post-devolution UK’, (2012) 14 The British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 285 at 287. 
47 W. Swenden & N. McEwen, ‘UK devolution in the shadow of hierarchy? Intergovernmental relations and party politics’, 
(2014) 12 Comparative European Politics, 488 at 506. 
48 A. Cole & R. Palmer, ‘Europeanising devolution: Wales and the European Union’, (2013) British Politics, 379 at 393. 
49 C. Burns et al, Environmental policy in a devolved United Kingdom, (2018), https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/BrexitEnvUKReport.pdf.  
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noted above, Northern Ireland’s implementation of EU law has been rife with delay, errors and non-
compliance. But despite its many failings, devolved implementation did offer the opportunity for further 
North/South cooperation, especially in the context of the GFBA and the inclusion of the environment 
as an area of cooperation for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.50 This has resulted in several 
examples of practical cooperation, including the joint implementation across the island of Ireland of the 
EU’s flagship Water Framework Directive51 and the rollout of a joint response to the threat of invasive 
species.52  
However, the EU referendum result has now placed intergovernmental relations in the UK under severe 
strain, reflected in devolved governments’ responses to the referendum. Both the Welsh53 and Scottish54 
governments published their own Brexit plans in the winter of 2016-2017 – calling for continued 
membership of the Single Market and Customs Union either for the UK or for their respective nations 
only, and in the case of the Welsh government, for the replacement of the JMC by an EU-inspired 
Council of Ministers. No similar plans were issued by the Northern Ireland Executive – the only joint 
statement on Brexit is a letter from August 2016 to Theresa May, signed by both the First Minister and 
deputy First Minister and outlining significant concerns particular to Northern Ireland – specifically the 
border with the Republic of Ireland, business competitiveness, energy security, the absence of EU 
funding programmes and a range of issues relating to the agri-food sector.55 While a JMC (European 
Negotiations) was established to help feed devolved priorities into the UK Brexit negotiation position, 
it failed to meet between February and October 2017, a critical period in which the Prime Minister 
started the Article 50 process. This gap underlined the complete control of the UK government over the 
JMC, and its monopoly in convening meetings (or, crucially, choosing not to). When the JMC 
(European Negotiations) finally met again in October 2017, its conclusions set out the need to agree 
‘Common Frameworks’ to underpin public policies after Brexit. These frameworks could take the form 
of “common goals, minimum or maximum standards, harmonisation, limits on action, or mutual 
recognition”,56 grounded in political or legally binding UK-wide agreements. Most notably for Northern 
Ireland, this declaration stated that the Common Frameworks could be either UK-wide or GB-wide and 
would have to comply with the GFBA.  
                                                          
50 Brennan et al, n.3.  
51 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the Community action 
in the field of water policy, [2000] OJ L327/1. 
52 V. Gravey et al, Northern Ireland: Challenges and opportunities for post-Brexit environmental governance, (2018), The UK 
in a Changing Europe, http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Northern-Ireland-challenges-and-opportunities-to-
post-Brexit-environmental-governance.pdf.  
53 Welsh Government, Securing Wales’ Future, 2017, https://beta.gov.wales/sites/default/files/2017-
01/30683SecuringWales¹Future_ENGLISH_WEB.pdf.  
54 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Place in Europe, 2016, http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00512073.pdf.   
55 Letter from Arlene Foster and Martin McGuinness to Theresa May, 10th August 2016, https://www.executiveoffice-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/execoffice/Letter%20to%20PM%20from%20FM%20%26%20dFM.pdf.  
56 JMC Conclusions 16.10.2017 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652285/Joint_Ministerial_Committee_commu
nique.pdf.   
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The subsequent list of frameworks published by the UK Cabinet Office in March 2018 highlights the 
imbalance of priorities for the UK government and raises significant concerns for environmental 
protection. Out of 153 areas of devolved competences affected by Brexit, 24 would require legislative 
frameworks, 82 would require non-legislative, political agreements and in 49 areas devolved 
governments would be free to diverge.57 A clear prioritisation in protecting a UK single market and 
facilitating trade is reflected in the common frameworks. In contrast, while one of the bases for 
Common Frameworks agreed in October 2017 was to “enable the management of common resources”, 
the Cabinet list possesses huge environmental gaps. Water is considered as not requiring any 
frameworks, whilst Air Quality and Biodiversity would only require political agreement. The obvious 
transboundary nature of these issues – part of what makes them ‘common resources’ – appears 
forgotten. The list’s limited nature highlights the potential for shifts in environmental governance after 
Brexit. The current EU environmental frameworks are protected from conflicting political will and 
objectives at both devolved and UK levels, even where interacting with reserved powers. However, 
whilst the JMC’s work highlights the potential to develop common frameworks within the UK, the 
current proposals are highly limited. Further, the list’s creation is heavily centralised in Westminster 
without adequately addressing more regional concerns. This is particularly problematic in Northern 
Ireland – where environmental governance faces very distinctive challenges such as managing cross-
border environmental risks (with a non-UK country which it currently shares EU common frameworks 
with), the involvement of groups with paramilitary links in environmental crime, dealing with the legacy 
of past neglects and political disinterest in environmental issues.58 It also fails to recognise potential 
future challenges which may arise, dependent on the nature of the UK’s exit deal. For example, 
disparities in control relating to waste regulation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
in the early 2000s, coupled with differing rates of landfill tax, led directly to the creation of a black 
market in illegal transboundary shipments of waste.59 The fact that this regulatory divergence occurred 
even within the parameters of existence of EU frameworks (in this case the waste directive and 
transboundary shipments of waste) demonstrates the vast potential for  further, problematic divergence 
should those frameworks be removed.60  In future there may be no regulatory alignment on the island 
of Ireland, no enforced cooperation as currently required regarding river basins or nature protection for 
instance, and no clear governance mechanisms for enabling engagement in cross-border decision-
making and litigation. The proposed common frameworks areas simply do not address these challenges, 
                                                          
57 Cabinet Office, Frameworks Analysis, 2018 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/686991/20180307_FINAL__Frameworks_an
alysis_for_publication_on_9_March_2018.pdf. The discrepancy in numbers is due to a couple of areas appearing under more 
than one heading. 
58 S. Turner and C. Brennan, ‘Modernising Environmental Regulation in Northern Ireland: A Case Study in Devolved Decision 
Making’ (2012) 63 NILQ 509. 
59 Brennan, n.5; and S. Cave (2016) ‘Background paper on Waste Management in Northern Ireland’, Northern Ireland 
Assembly Research and Information Service Briefing Paper 
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-2021/2017/aera/1017.pdf. 
60 House of Lords EU Committee (2016) Brexit: UK-Irish relations 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/76/76.pdf.  
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both in light of their apparent preferences for political cooperation a priori and their current scope 
(limited to within the UK). 
3.2 Lowering standards and diluted principles and objectives 
In addition, Northern Ireland’s environmental governance record raises a host of questions about the 
kind of divergence that might occur if the UK were no longer bound by EU standards. This has become 
an issue of concern across the UK,61 but has particular resonance in Northern Ireland given its history 
of failures coupled with a pronounced political antipathy (and at times hostility) towards prioritising 
environmental concerns. Currently the EU provides a body of law that sets minimum standards and 
approaches that Member States, including the UK and its devolved governments, are obliged to 
transpose, implement and enforce. Although divergence is possible to some extent, minimum standards 
and objectives set at EU level must be met. Thus, Northern Ireland can vary its approach to a certain 
degree, but there is, at present, a regulatory baseline that is also shared by the rest of the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland. This includes requirements of cross-border cooperation as noted above.  
Furthermore, EU environmental law is underpinned by the objectives of sustainable development62 and 
a high level of protection of the environment, complemented by principles such as prevention, 
precaution, polluter pays, proximity and integration.63 These objectives and principles simultaneously 
guide and restrict Northern Ireland’s actions in this field. Beyond influencing the creation of policy and 
legislation, their role in the UK and EU courts’ teleological/purposive interpretation of the legislation 
is crucial,64 as demonstrated for example in the definition of waste65 or through the courts’ interpretation 
of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive in light of the precautionary principle to require an appropriate 
assessment unless it is established beyond reasonable doubt that there will be no significant effects 
posed.66 This has also impacted upon the Northern Irish courts and environmental governance, as 
reflected in the Court of Appeal’s approach in Felix O’Hare67 where the court adopted the Court of 
Justice of the EU’s (CJEU’s) reasoning and its purposive interpretation in light of the ‘high level of 
protection of the environment based on the precautionary approach’ to provide for ‘a wide interpretation 
of the categories of waste’.68 It is also worth noting that the Aarhus principles regarding access to 
environmental information, public participation in environmental decision-making and access to justice 
in environmental matters69 can also play a fundamental role in ensuring good governance and helping 
                                                          
61 C. Reid, ‘Brexit and the future of UK environmental law’, (2016) 34 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 407. 
62 Article 3(3) TEU. 
63 Articles 11 and 191 TFEU. 
64 Champion, R (on the application of) v North Norfolk District Council & Anor [2015] UKSC 52 (22 July 2015); and C-6/04 
Commission v UK [2005] ECR I-09017. 
65 R v Jones (Evan) [2011] EWCA Crim 3294. 
66 C-6/04 European Commission v United Kingdom [2005] ECR I-9017, para 54. 
67 Department of the Environment and Heritage Service v Felix O’Hare & Co Ltd and James Phillips t/a Phillips Contracts, 
[2007] NICA 45, [2008] Env L.R. 28. 
68 Ibid, at 13 and 16. 
69 Derived from the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), 25 June 1998, 
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strengthen compliance.70 This is reflected in the increasingly important role of Northern Ireland public 
interest groups in challenging environmental decision-making through the exercise of these principles 
and the rights stemming from them.71 Overall, these objectives and principles thereby strengthen 
existing environmental law and facilitate its evolution by the courts across the EU, including in Northern 
Ireland. 
Left to its own devices, there is good cause for concern that the devolved government (should it re-
emerge from this period of collapse) in Northern Ireland would prove unwilling, or unable to maintain 
environmental standards, their implementation and enforcement post-Brexit. Even when there has been 
a devolved government in situ, there has been little political will to prioritise environmental concerns 
and the nature of flawed environmental governance mechanisms within Northern Ireland makes self-
driven creation and implementation of environmental law and policy highly unreliable. The situation of 
the contaminated land regime is a prime example of this, where Northern Ireland created a statutory 
framework to address this issue in 1997,72 but never commenced the relevant provisions that sit 
gathering dust. Of particular concern is that the DUP, who by a small margin remain the largest party 
in Northern Ireland, have in the past adopted an almost aggressive stance towards environmental 
protection.73 This has been demonstrated on numerous occasions, not least in the appointment of an 
ardent climate-sceptic (Sammy Wilson) as Minister for the Environment74 or former first Minister 
Arlene Foster’s rejection of the need for an independent environmental regulator – despite a tidal wave 
of evidence indicating the urgent need for this crucial structural reform.75 Even if the DUP were no 
longer the largest party, the nature of power-sharing in Northern Ireland means that they may still hold 
the environmental portfolio or could use the controversial petition of concern process to effectively veto 
issues considered to relate to cross-community matters.76 Consequently, there is little hope for a ‘Green 
Brexit’ from Northern Ireland if it is reliant on its own devolved government. Whilst no panacea,77 the 
continued presence of EU environmental standards, objectives and principles has been able to provide 
                                                          
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf.  E.g R. Caranta, A. Gerbandy and B. Müller, the 
Making of a New European Legal Culture: the Aarhus Convention, (Europa Law Publishing, 2018). 
70 E.g. Case 664/15 Protect Natur-, Arten- und Landschaftschutz Umweltorganisation, ECLI:EU:C:2017:987; M. Lee and C. 
Abbot, ‘The Usual Suspects? Public Participation and the Aarhus Convention’, (2003) 66:1 The Modern Law Review 80; and 
J. Darpö, ‘Article 9.2 of the Aarhus Convention and EU Law’ (2014) 11:4 Journal for European Environmental and Planning 
Law 367; B. Toth, ‘Public Participation and Democracy in Practice – Aarhus Convention Principles as Democratic Institution 
Building in the Developing World’, (2010) 30:2 Journal of Land, Resources and Environmental Law 295; and M. Dellinger, 
‘Ten Years of the Aarhus Convention: How Procedural Democracy is Paving the Way for Substantive Change in National and 
International Environmental Law’, (2012) 23:2 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 309. 
71 This issues is discussed further infra, but see e.g. Alternative A5 Alliance’s Application for Judicial Review, [2013] NIQB 
30; and Friends of the Earth Ltd’s Application for Judicial Review [2016] NIQB 91. 
72 Waste and Contaminated Land Order (NI) 1997. 
73 T. Greene, ‘An unhealthy environment – the DUP, environmental policies and Brexit’, Open Democracy UK, 12th February 
2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/tommy-greene/unhealthy-environment-dup-environmental-policies-and-brexit. 
74 L. Stewart, ‘Sammy Wilson, the Northern Ireland Minister at odds with the world’s climate experts in Copenhagen’, (Belfast 
Telegraph, 8th December 2009), https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/environment/sammy-wilson-the-northern-ireland-
minister-at-odds-with-the-worlds-climate-experts-in-copenhagen-28505862.html.  
75 Turner & Brennan, n.58 at 517 and 520. 
76 Ibid. 
77 E. Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law, (Hart, 2017), chapters 4 and 6., discussing 
the varying role of environmental principles within EU law. 
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some counterweight to the devolved government’s problematic approach to environmental 
considerations through imposing requirements on the politicians or regulatory bodies and through 
purposive interpretation. Although Northern Ireland will still be bound by the UK’s international law 
obligations,78 Brexit now threatens to remove the important environmental safety net provided by 
membership of the EU to date.  
3.3 An absence of enforcement and accountability 
The third element to consider is accountability and the enforcement of environmental law and there are 
two strands to this particular vulnerability in Northern Ireland. Firstly, an internal domestic record of 
particularly weak enforcement of environmental rules and secondly, the consequent need to ensure that 
the devolved government is held to account for failures in this regard. In terms of the first strand, 
declining environmental quality and successive scandals involving environmental criminality have led 
to a sense that the rule of environmental law has not been effectively enforced and that the structural 
arrangements for delivering this core regulatory function are not fit for purpose. Recurrent issues on a 
practical level include: the highly-criticised performance of the Northern Ireland Environment Agency 
(NIEA) in ensuring proper implementation of environmental law; problems with prosecution of 
breaches of environmental law by both the NIEA and the Public Prosecution Service (PPS); and the 
level of penalties/sentences in environmental prosecution being insufficient to deter non-compliance 
with environmental law. 79 These issues have been well documented both in academic analyses and in 
a litany of highly-critical scrutiny reports over the last thirty years. However, on a structural level 
critiques have coalesced around NIEA’s position within a central government department (DAERA) 
and the need for an independent environmental regulator in order to prevent the development of 
accountability gaps and to ensure that the rule of environmental law is not subject to political 
interference.80 With no meaningful reform occurring despite overwhelming evidence indicating its 
necessity, the second core issue – the need for government accountability for weak environmental 
decision-making has become increasingly important.  
Although internal accountability mechanisms do exist within Northern Ireland’s governance system, it 
is questionable as to how effective these have been in holding the devolved government and the civil 
service to account.  While scrutiny of environmental decision-making has been undertaken by (for 
example) the Northern Ireland Audit Office (NIAO), the Criminal Justice Inspection (CJI) and also by 
the Northern Ireland Assembly Environment Committee, the subsequent findings of these reports have, 
                                                          
78 C. Reid, ‘Brexit and the Devolution Dynamics’ (2017) 19 ELR 3-5. 
79 A detailed exploration of the history of environmental governance failures in Northern Ireland up until 2017 can be found 
in Brennan et al (n 3) and detailed analysis of issues with the prosecution of environmental non-compliance is available in C. 
Brennan, The Enforcement of Environmental Regulation in Northern Ireland: A Story of Politics, Penalties and Paradigm 
Shifts? (PhD thesis, Queen’s University Belfast 2013). 
80 Turner & Brennan, n.58. 
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to some extent at least, been ignored.81 The minimal credence given to internal scrutiny criticism means 
that overarching EU accountability mechanisms have taken on an enhanced importance in holding the 
devolved government to account. On the one hand, membership of the EU initially requires that any 
domestic penalties for breaching relevant EU environmental law be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.82 However, a further central element that has proven crucial for environmental governance 
in Northern Ireland is the potential for the Commission to take actions against Member States for breach 
of EU law and for the CJEU to impose financial penalties.83 Although characterised as slow-moving 
and imperfect,84 the accountability and enforcement mechanisms designed to ensure EU law is 
transposed and implemented throughout Member States have played an important coercive role in 
ensuring that the devolved government has at least attempted to achieve some level of compliance.85 
Crucially, since the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the devolved government rather than Westminster is 
liable for the potentially crippling cost of any financial sanctions imposed for breaches of its EU law 
obligations.86 The resulting threat of financial sanctions has forced the devolved government to take 
action on a number of occasions, for example in the context of illegal dumping of waste across the Irish 
border.87 Dependent on the final Brexit deal, these important accountability and enforcement functions 
may be lost in part, or in their entirety.88 Future environmental governance in the UK (and especially 
Northern Ireland given its past enforcement difficulties) will therefore require not merely principles as 
discussed above, but also processes and structures to replicate or replace these important fail-safes, and 
to ensure environmental decision-making is accountable and environmental rules are effectively 
enforced. In Northern Ireland, this will require reform not only to internal approaches to enforcement 
and to the processes for holding government to account at a domestic level – but will also clearly 
requires some overarching mechanism to ensure that the devolved government (should it be reinstated) 
is implementing, enforcing and ultimately upholding the rule of environmental law at a systemic level. 
4. From ‘quick fixes’ to long term solutions  
                                                          
81 Brennan et al, n.3, at 134. 
82 Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law, [2008] OJ L328/28. 
83 The European Commission can initiate infringement proceedings against member states that have failed to fulfil a Treaty 
obligation, including referral to the Court of Justice of The European Union who have the power to impose financial penalties 
(Art 258-260 TFEU). See, e.g. G. Faulkner, ‘Fines against member states: An effective new tool in EU infringement 
proceedings?’ Comparative European Politics (2016) 14(1), 36-52.   
84 M. Hedemann-Robinson, Enforcement of European Union Environmental Law, 2nd Edition (Routledge: London, 2015); R. 
Lee, ‘Always Keep a Hold of Nurse: British Environmental Law and Exit from the European Union’ (2017) 29 JEL 155. 
85 B. Jack, ‘Environmental Law in Northern Ireland’ in S. McKay and M. Murray, Planning Law and Practice in Northern 
Ireland (Routledge, 2017), 154-155. 
86 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements: Between the United 
Kingdom Government Scottish Ministers and the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland 
Executive Committee (Cm 5420, 2001) para B4.25. 
87 J. Mulgrew, ‘Republic of Ireland’s Illegal Waste Sent Back’ Belfast Telegraph (Belfast, 24th August 2011) 
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/environment/republic-of-irelands-illegal-waste-sent-back-28649887.html. 
88 UKELA, Brexit and Environmental Law Enforcement and Political Accountability Issues, (2017), 
https://www.ukela.org/content/doclib/317.pdf.  
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4.1 Designing common frameworks 
Without an operating devolved government, Northern Ireland essentially must rely on the UK 
government to consider its interests and its particular needs in the design and governance of common 
frameworks which will replace the EU frameworks when the UK leave the EU. Unfortunately, there is 
little indication (beyond a general commitment to upholding the GFBA and the need to address the 
backstop) that this has entered the consciousness of the UK government – whose focus to date has been 
on developing an approach for, primarily, England.89 Ahead of Brexit, a number of ‘quick fixes’ are 
needed to avoid confusion concerning what rules still apply and what institutions still have oversight.90 
Central to this endeavour to date is the EU Withdrawal Act (EUWA)– a large copy-pasting exercise, 
aiming to deliver continued legal certainty post-Brexit. The EUWA sets out how control will be taken 
back in practice – and creates a holdover pattern: devolved ministers will see the requirement to act 
within remits of EU law amended to cover the remits of retained EU law, and be given limited powers 
to amend legislation compared to UK ministers. It attempts to avoid ‘regulatory gaps’ by providing for 
a new legal foundation for existing domestic law implementing EU Directives, transposing EU 
Regulations that are currently directly applicable into UK law, and providing for the application of 
existing judgments by the CJEU. The UK is also attempting to adapt the law to manage references to 
EU processes, e.g. assessments by the European Food Safety Authority or reporting to the EU 
Commission. However, the EUWA’s narrow understanding of the acquis (transposed Directives, 
Regulations and existing judgments) leaves a number of gaps open, most notably in relation to 
principles and governance arrangements (see below). This is acknowledged by Section 8 of the EUWA, 
which is a controversial ‘Henry VIII clause’ designed to enable the relevant UK government ministers 
to address ‘deficiencies’ for two years post-Brexit. In the context of environmental law this is 
particularly problematic as it is clear that substantial uncertainties surround the future direction of UK 
environmental law and policy, and will continue to do so for years post-Brexit.  
Crucially, the EUWA promotes a ‘common’ UK approach being determined in Westminster, by the UK 
Parliament or, with the use of Henry VIII powers, the UK government. However, while centralisation 
may be necessary to ensure clarity in the Brexit delivery process, this should be considered an interim 
solution. Environmental protection is a devolved issue within the UK and should predominately rest 
with the devolved jurisdictions. Critically, the four UK nations need to be able to work together on 
tackling shared environmental challenges, to adopt and implement common frameworks, without these 
being imposed from above/Westminster. The current tensions around ‘power grabs’ undermine 
cooperation to tackle shared environmental challenges.91 This is reflected in the very limited number of 
                                                          
89 E.g. DEFRA, n.31, which applies to England and reserved matters only. 
90 Evidence submitted by Colin Reid (et al.) to Scottish Parliament Finance and Constitution Committee (August 2018) 
http://www.parliament.scot/S5_Finance/Inquiries/Brexit_and_Environment_Academics.pdf. 
91 S. Morris and S. Carrell, ‘Tories using Brexit to grab back devolved powers, say ministers’, (The Guardian, 26th February 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/feb/26/tories-using-brexit-to-grab-back-devolved-powers-say-ministers.  
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common frameworks identified by the JMC; as noted above, out of 153 areas identified where pre-
existing frameworks in the form of European Directives are legally binding across the entire EU, 
legislative frameworks were deemed necessary for only 24 areas. Further these are only internal UK 
frameworks, with any regulatory alignment or cooperation frameworks with the Republic of Ireland 
being contingent currently on the eventual relationship with the EU and any approved Withdrawal 
Agreement. This raises concerns of both the risk of a ‘race to the bottom’ and the potential for 
divergences with subsequent negative externalities via transboundary effects. This has further knock-
on effects, as it becomes more difficult to cooperate cross-border as divergence increases. While both 
Wales and Scotland have shown their environmental credentials in the past, their efforts could 
potentially be undermined by English policies to roll-back environmental standards – and, in the 
absence of shared policies, it would be much easier for Northern Ireland to further downgrade its 
environment.92 Consequently, greater consideration is needed of common frameworks (and avenues 
through which they might be achieved) for the UK and Northern Ireland, whether at a domestic UK 
level or in conjunction with the Republic of Ireland.  
 Firstly, a foundation based in a broad conceptualisation of subsidiarity, grounded in a bottom-up 
approach, could be considered more legitimate from the perspectives of both effectiveness and 
democracy. Environmental competence should be devolved – to the regional, or local level – unless and 
until meeting agreed policy objectives require coordinated action at a higher level of governance, e.g. 
at the level of the UK.93 Secondly, in light of proportionality and as stated in the October 2017 JMC 
communiqué, different levels of constraints can be imagined – from no frameworks and full divergence 
within the remits of international agreements to political agreements between governments and 
legislative frameworks. Thirdly, a common UK approach could be reached in a cooperative, 
intergovernmental manner, with the four administrations agreeing to work together on an issue, under 
the watchful eye of their respective legislatures. This is the approach put forward by the Welsh 
Government, which supports the replacement of the JMC with a new UK Council of Minister, based on 
the EU template.94 Fourthly, building on and expanding upon the list of rationales for common 
frameworks agreed in October 2017,95 variegated geometries of frameworks could be pursued. These 
geometries may fit within the geography of these islands – GB-wide on the one hand, North/South 
cooperation on the other – or conversely be built on shared policy objectives, political will to pool 
resources and see ad-hoc cooperation between Northern Ireland and Wales or Scotland on specific 
                                                          
92 C. Burns, et al., n.49. 
93 M. Dobbs, ‘Attaining Subsidiarity-Based Multilevel Governance of Genetically Modified Cultivation?’ (2016) 28(2) JEL 
245. 
94 Welsh Government, n.53. 
95 Principle 1 of the Communiqué states that: ‘Common frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to: 
enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence; ensure compliance with 
international obligations; ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and international 
treaties; enable the management of common resources; administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border 
element; safeguard the security of the UK.’ 
18 
 
policy areas. Such an approach would enable two or more frameworks to overlap over Northern Ireland, 
thereby continuing both North/South cooperation and limiting UK-wide or GB/NI divergence, e.g. 
minimum standards for water quality could be maintained throughout the UK, while allowing Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to continue to jointly implement the EU’s Water Framework 
Directive (and its retained copy in Northern Ireland).  
4.2 Enshrining environmental principles and related precepts 
Whether in common frameworks or simply in Northern Irish law, Northern Ireland has a clear need for 
maintaining and developing minimum standards and approaches to environmental protection. As noted 
above, the EUWA will attempt to fill this need temporarily through retaining much of EU derived law, 
but it leaves gaps, returns control to the devolved jurisdictions eventually (enabling divergences) and 
does not provide for the future evolution of environmental law. Common frameworks as outlined above 
are crucial for Northern Ireland in a post-Brexit scenario and could help in ensuring the continued 
existence and creation of environmental standards, but such frameworks would likely be quite sparse 
and take extended periods to create or amend. Further, this still leaves potential for a restrictive 
interpretation by Northern Irish politicians, regulators, courts or individuals that would undermine 
environmental protection. Something extra is needed to ensure that Northern Ireland itself acts to protect 
the environment and does not undermine the situation further – at all stages of environmental 
governance.  
One potential vehicle for achieving this could be an Environmental Charter, inspired by, but going 
beyond, documents such as the 2004 French Environmental Charter.96 It could encompass binding 
fundamental environmental precepts to guide and direct Northern Ireland environmental governance, 
going beyond the core objectives and principles to also encompass rights and duties (see the Table 
below). However, it is clear that the UK’s approach for England, and to a limited extent for the rest of 
the UK,97 as outlined in the Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill98 is considerably flawed99 
and no such creature, despite the real possibility that it may provide the basis of the Northern Irish 
approach in the absence of the devolved government.100  
                                                          
96 D. Marrani, ‘Reinforcing environmental rights: the French charter for the environment’, (2015) 25 European Journal of 
Fundamental Rights 383. This was given constitutional status in 2005: Loi constitutionnelle n° 2005-205 du 1er mars 2005 
relative à la Charte de l'environnement (JORF n°0051 du 2 mars 2005 page 3697). 
97 Whilst the proposed provisions on principles are to apply to the entirety of the UK, it is only in relation to the actions of UK 
ministers – this automatically limits the applicability to Northern Ireland since environmental protection is devolved. 
98 Draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill, CM9751, December 2018, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766849/draft-
environment-bill-governance-principles.pdf. This builds upon Section 16 of the EUWA and also DEFRA’s consultation on 
Environmental Governance and Principles, n.31. 
99 M. Dobbs, ‘Environmental principles in the Environment Bill’, Brexit and Environment, 30th January 2019, 
https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/2019/01/30/environmental-principles-environment-bill/; and M. Lee and E.A.K. 
Scotford, ‘Environmental Principles After Brexit: The Draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill, working paper, 
30 January 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3322341. 
100 n.37. 
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As required by Section 16 of the EUWA, the Environment Bill provides in clauses 1-4 for the creation 
by the Environment Secretary of a policy statement on environmental principles, as well as providing 
some indicators of their range, role and effect. However, whilst the use of primary legislation as a 
vehicle for incorporating requirements to engage with the principles is welcome and provides weight to 
their status and role domestically, the considerable reliance upon the use of the policy statement is 
concerning – especially as the government is to have regard to the statement itself and not the principles 
within the eventual legislation.101 The statement is to outline the principles’ interpretation and 
application, yet need not address policies that the Secretary deems irrelevant (beyond those 
automatically excluded in the Bill)102 and can be revised by the Secretary at any time.103 This could 
enable the UK to water down the principles substantially or control the ability of the courts to engage 
effectively with the principles. Legislation suffers from its own flaws, but the reliance on the policy 
statement undermines the principles and leaves them hostage to fortune. 
Further, the Bill is considerably limited in range.104 Clause 2 defines the principles as meaning the core 
traditional environmental principles (prevention, precaution, proximity/source, and polluter pays), 
alongside the 3 Aarhus principles (access to environmental information, public participation in 
environmental decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters), and environmental 
integration. It also includes sustainable development as a principle, although the accompanying 
Information paper notes the potential to incorporate it as an overarching objective in the final Bill.105 
However, it includes no other principles or objectives, such as a high level of protection, environmental 
improvement, good governance principles or principles regarding cross-border cooperation and 
prevention of transboundary harm. Further, the versions included in the Bill are somewhat limited in 
scope and nature, e.g. through not referring to human health also or Clause 2 simply saying ‘the 
precautionary principle so far as relating to the environment’. They also reflect older versions of the 
principles, whereas there is potential to develop or adopt more innovative, progressive principles. 
In light of Northern Ireland’s environmental history, the land border with the Republic of Ireland and 
extra pressures and uncertainties posed by Brexit, Northern Ireland needs to go beyond the Environment 
Bill and indeed beyond what is included within even EU law currently – it needs to be able rely on a 
suite of relevant fundamental precepts (objectives, rights, principles and duties) to prevent further 
environmental degradation and also help rectify existing problems. In this context, a central principle 
to include for Northern Ireland would be one of non-regression – to act as an environmental guarantee 
                                                          
101  O.W. Pedersen, ‘Post-Brexit environmental accountability and enforcement – Who is afraid of the courts?’, (2018) 20(3) 
ELR, 133. 
102 Dobbs, n.99. 
103 Pedersen, n101. 
104 Dobbs, n.99. 
105 DEFRA, ‘Information paper on the policy statement on Environmental Principles’, December 2018, p.13, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766299/env-bill-
information-paper.pdf.  
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preventing further degradation. The Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community 
published in November 2018106 (EU Withdrawal Agreement, EUWA) includes this as a principle that 
would bind both the EU and the UK for the duration of the transition period when a single customs 
territory would exist, supported by the four core environmental principles.107 However, whilst covering 
‘law, regulations and practices’, this relates to a list of issues that is quite extensive, but exhaustive – 
reflected in the aim that this will promote a ‘level playing field’ and is not simply for the sake of 
environmental protection. Further, whether this apparent willingness to maintain environmental 
standards that parallel those set down by the EU will persist is as uncertain as the fate of the Draft 
Agreement itself;108 it simply highlights the potential for either party or indeed individual Member 
States/devolved jurisdictions to undermine environmental protection to gain a competitive advantage if 
the agreement is not approved by the UK or if no similar principle or objective is included in the 
documents governing subsequent relations. It is therefore crucial to adopt non-regression as a domestic 
objective applying to environmental protection across the board - irrespective of any eventual trade 
agreement. However, non-regression is still limited in its nature and further objectives and principles 
will be required for Northern Ireland. By incorporating objectives such as a high level of protection and 
sustainable development within a Charter domestically, Northern Ireland would be adopting valuable 
aims to drive future Northern Ireland environmental policy and law post-Brexit, as well as encouraging 
continued regulatory alignment with the EU and the Republic of Ireland – which would help address 
cross-border issues and also questions of a ‘level-playing field’ in the context of continued trade, 
whether in the scope of the current EU Withdrawal Agreement or otherwise.  
A wide range of environmental and general governance principles is open to Northern Ireland for 
adoption, which can help drive purposive approaches, support public interest litigation or otherwise 
bolster environmental protection. For instance, principles of accountability, transparency and due 
process in conjunction with the Aarhus principles could help enable environmental NGOs in bringing 
crucial litigation to protect the environment. Some principles will become of particular importance for 
Northern Ireland post-Brexit, where they deal with power allocation (e.g. subsidiarity)109 or cross-
border issues (e.g. avoidance of transboundary harm110 or cross-border cooperation).111 Consequently, 
Northern Ireland should reflect on the full spectrum available and adopt a broad range of principles. 
Regard must also be given to the fact that numerous variations of these principles exist – 19 versions of 
                                                          
106 European Commission, n.16. 
107 European Commission, n.16, Annex 4, Part 2, Article 2. 
108 C. Reid, ‘Environmental Commitments in the Withdrawal Agreement’, Brexit and Environment, 15th November 2018, 
https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/2018/11/15/environment-withdrawal-agreement/.  
109 Dobbs, n.93; A. Engel & L. Petetin, ‘International obligations and devolved powers – ploughing through competences and 
GM crops’, (2018) 20(1) ELR 16. 
110 Established in ‘Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision’, (1941) 35 American Journal of International Law 684, at 716-7. 
111 E.g. the 1999 UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a transboundary context (Espoo Convention) 
generally, including assessments for potential transboundary harm and providing for further multilateral or bilateral 
cooperation: http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/Espoo_Convention_authentic_ENG.pdf. 
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the precautionary principle alone have been catalogued.112 Bearing in mind Northern Ireland’s legacy 
and also the flexible nature of these principles, Northern Ireland should strive to incorporate strong, 
broad and ambitious versions.113 For instance, the precautionary principle could be adopted in a fashion 
that proactively calls for protective measures where potential threats exist in the context of uncertainty, 
rather than simply justifying them. In doing so, sufficient detail will be required within legislation to 
avoid the principles being watered down or bypassed, whilst not creating an ‘iron cage’ and 
undermining the advantages that their flexibility provide.114 Care should also be undertaken to avoid 
these principles being captured by the government in order to curtail their use by the courts.115  
Northern Ireland should also consider incorporating both procedural (e.g. rights to a fair trial and 
effective remedy) and substantive (e.g. right to a private life or right to a clean and healthy environment) 
rights116 within the Environmental Charter. If present as enforceable rights, they could act as effective 
tools to promote environmental protection. Many of the procedural rights in particular exist currently 
in Northern Ireland – including via the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR), the Aarhus Convention and the Human Rights Act 1998. However, the EU 
sources may no longer be applicable post-Brexit, future adherence to the ECHR is not guaranteed 
(membership of the EU mandates membership of the ECHR) and existing rights in even the Human 
Rights Act may be undermined. It is also worth highlighting that, despite incorporating the Aarhus 
principles, the Environment Bill would not enable individuals or NGOs to continue to rely upon them 
as rights – as they are left as unenforceable concepts intended to drive policy rather than grant rights.117 
Even with continued adherence to the ECHR, a shift away from the Aarhus Convention in particular 
would have significant impacts as the procedural rights vary in role, depth and strength across the 
different documents.118 Further, whilst the existing regime includes substantive rights such as the right 
to a private life,119 which has been raised regarding environmental matters,120 it currently does not 
expressly encompass specific substantive environmental rights, such as a right to a clean 
environment.121 Considering that Northern Ireland has such a poor legacy of environmental protection, 
                                                          
112 P. Sandin, ‘Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle’ (1999) 5 Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 889. 
113 See the discussion and tables in Brennan et al, n.15. 
114 M. Dobbs, ‘Flexible Rationality: Legitimising the Precautionary Principle?’, Presentation at the UK IVR Conference, 
Sheffield, November 2017. 
115 Pedersen, n101. 
116 E.g. A. Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’, (2007) 18:3 Fordham Environmental Law 
Review, 471. It would also be possible to consider the inclusion of nature rights, e.g. the right to standing of trees as outlined 
in C.D. Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects’, (1972) 45 Southern California Law 
Review 45. See also, R. Carnwath, ‘Human rights and the Environment’, (20180) Justice Human Rights Law Conference, 10 
October 2018, London, https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-181010.pdf.  However, consideration of such rights is 
beyond the scope of this article.  
117 Lee and Scotford, n.99, p.10. 
118 B. Peters, ‘Unpacking the Diversity of Procedural Environmental Rights: The European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Aarhus Convention’, (2018) 30: 1 Journal of Environmental Law, 1. 
119 E.g. Schedule 1, Article 8 of the Human Rights Act; and Article 8 of the ECHR. 
120 E.g. Hatton and Others v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 1 regarding Heathrow airport.  
121 Carnwath, n, 116. 
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incorporating these rights domestically could be a crucial step to resolve the existing deficits122 and to 
avoid further degradation.  
However, incorporation of a broad range of objectives, principles and rights is of little use unless done 
in an effective manner that recognises contextual considerations. In the EU, the approach to these has 
varied,123 but generally a positive environmental political will, obligations upon the EU institutions 
incorporated into the Treaties, duties of loyalty upon Member States, and a pro-active Court of Justice 
of EU with its teleological approach124 have spread and strengthened the role of objectives and 
principles. However, these contextual factors are not replicated in the UK or indeed Northern Ireland 
and their absence heightens the challenges for achieving the full potential of the objectives, principles 
and rights. In the draft Environment Bill, principles are directed simply at UK governmental ministers 
who must ‘have regard to’ them – via the policy statement. This is despite the current role of objectives 
and principles across the whole of environmental governance, including in the purposive approach, and 
knowing that such phrasing is ambiguous and soft, granting excessive discretion to decision-makers, 
especially in the context of judicial review125 and enabling duties to be ignored and limited.126 There is 
a clear risk that if no corresponding duties are incorporated, then the Secretary of State’s erroneous 
belief expressed in July 2018 that principles do not form part of the law127 may materialise. These flaws 
are intensified for Northern Ireland, where for instance enforceable obligations against lax or unhelpful 
state bodies could compel compliance. If the objectives, principles and rights outlined above are to have 
any meaningful influence, clear and forceful corresponding duties must also be incorporated. These 
duties must be imposed on all actors to strive to achieve the relevant environmental objectives, abide 
by the relevant principles and respect the relevant rights when developing, implementing or enforcing 
any relevant law or policy.  
Northern Ireland clearly needs to go beyond the Environment Bill on all fronts – the Environment Bill 
is simply too limited and weak, ‘undermin[ing] or misconstrue[ing] key features’ of environmental 
principles as they exist currently.128 Embedding such fundamental precepts (objective, principles, rights 
and duties) within binding law for Northern Ireland would help strengthen existing environmental law 
and provide the basis for future developments, thereby helping to prevent further slippage and 
ameliorate the current situation. Incorporating this as an Environmental Charter for Northern would 
further strengthen environmental protection through providing an underpinning ‘grundnorm’. If this 
                                                          
122 O. Pedersen, ‘A Bill of Rights, Environmental Rights and the UK Constitution’, (2011) 3 Public Law, 577 at 593.  
123 E.g. regarding principles see Scotford, n.77, chapter 4. 
124 For a critical discussion of literature on whether the Court of Justice of the EU is activist or not, see A.A. Lorens, ‘The 
European Court of Justice, More than a Teleological Court’ (1999) 2 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 373. 
125 Environmental Audit Committee, The Government’s 25 Year Plan for the Environment, HC 803, 24 July 2018, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmenvaud/803/803.pdf. 
126 E.g. Select Committee on the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, The countryside at a crossroads: Is 
the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006 still fit for purpose?, HL 99, 22 March 2018, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldnerc/99/99.pdf. 
127 https://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/4df40b59-f1d4-4fe8-aa61-49f66c072fab. 
128 Lee and Scotford, n.99. 
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were extended via a common framework to the UK as a whole and/or the island of Ireland, this would 
strengthen it further politically and legally – key issues to address would be how it would be formulated 
and what level of commonality or divergence would be appropriate.129 It is however acknowledged that 
achieving political agreement for an Environmental Charter for even Northern Ireland would be highly 
challenging. To deliver one for the island of Ireland would raise the political and constitutional 
challenges significantly, although there is the potential for it to be considered in the context of the 
GFBA and the support for all-island cooperation in environmental protection. 
Proposed Precepts 
Examples of 
Types 
Proposed Environmental Charter – 
potential content 
Environment Bill 
Objectives • Sustainable development 
• High level of protection  
• Non-regression  
• Improvement of the environment 
• N/A currently – potential to adapt 
sustainable development. 
Core 
(traditional) 
environmental 
principles 
• Prevention 
• Precaution 
• Polluter pays 
• Rectification at source 
• Environmental integration 
 
• Prevention 
• Precaution 
• Polluter pays 
• Rectification at source 
• Environmental integration 
• Sustainable development  
(weaker, narrow versions at times) 
Aarhus 
principles 
• Access to environmental information, 
• Public participation in environmental 
decision-making  
• Wide and effective access to justice 
regarding environmental matters. 
(to be incorporated as principles conferring 
enforceable rights as per EU approach; 
strengthening the nature of access in light 
of the Wednesbury test) 
• Access to environmental information, 
• Public participation in environmental 
decision-making  
• Access to justice regarding environmental 
matters. 
(not rights – to influence policy and law 
development) 
                                                          
129 For discussions on this relating purely to rights, see Pedersen, n.122.  
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Cross-border 
cooperation 
principles 
• International cooperation and 
collaboration  
• Avoiding transboundary harm  
(to be incorporated as over-arching 
principles – applying to internal and 
external UK borders) 
• N/A.  
• Obligations under international law remain. 
General 
governance 
principles 
• Proportionality 
• Subsidiarity (broader version, rather than 
the simple EU version, to address 
devolution issues) 
• Effective deterrence 
• Good governance principles, e.g. 
transparency, accountability, effectiveness, 
and equality. 
• N/A  
• Found to varying extents in general domestic 
law.  
Rights • Substantive human rights such as a right 
to a clean and healthy environment. 
• Rights regarding due process, fair trial & 
effective justice. 
• Rights of future generations, beyond 
sustainable development.  
• Potential to consider ‘rights of nature’ 
• N/A 
• No substantive human rights directly 
regarding the environment in domestic law. 
• Relevant rights to privacy, life, due process, 
fair trial etc found in domestic law, e.g. the 
Human Rights Act.  
Duties 
 
• Duty to strive to achieve the relevant 
environmental objectives; 
• Duty to undertake tasks in light of all 
relevant environmental principles/base all 
actions on such principles; 
• Duty to respect relevant rights. 
• Minimal duty on UK Government ministers 
to ‘have regard to’ the principles in developing 
policy. 
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4.3 An Independent Environmental ‘Watchdog’ and enhanced use of judicial review 
Questions about how to fill the compliance and accountability gaps that will emerge across all parts of 
the UK post-Brexit are currently being considered by the UK government, the Scottish and Welsh 
devolved governments, NGOs and academics.130 However, the political vacuum in Northern Ireland has 
thus far prevented official consideration of these crucial issues at a devolved level.131 Despite laudable 
efforts to prepare for Brexit by the Northern Ireland civil service (albeit initially focused primarily on 
agricultural policy),132 it is therefore unlikely that any well-developed proposals tailored to the 
distinctive local environmental context will emerge by ‘Brexit-day’ in March 2019. This creates a 
heightened risk that proposals produced for other parts of the UK, or the UK as a whole, will simply be 
extended to Northern Ireland without any meaningful consideration of how they will work in that 
context. Given the well-documented and distinctive difficulties that have been experienced in Northern 
Ireland to date, this has the potential to be very problematic. An aggravating factor is the fact that the 
proposals which have emerged from the UK government thus far (which are designed to apply to 
England and Wales in the first instance) have been the subject of significant criticism and have been 
deemed by many commentators as unsuitable for any part of the UK.133 Although the EUWA and the 
draft Environment Bill provide further commitments which to some extent mitigate these concerns, as 
discussed above the fate of this agreement and any legislation stemming from it remain shrouded in 
uncertainty.134 
The creation of an ‘independent environmental watchdog’ is one of two central pillars in DEFRA 
proposals, now reflected in the draft Environment Bill in the form of the proposed Office for 
Environmental Protection (OEP). This was initially committed to in November 2017 by the UK 
Secretary of State, Michael Gove, in response to concerns that Brexit would lead to lowering 
environmental standards and a ‘bonfire of anti-pollution protections’.135 The commitment was then 
enshrined in the EUWA in June 2018, providing for the proposed watchdog to take proportionate 
enforcement action (including legal proceedings if necessary) where the authority considers that a 
minister of the Crown is not complying with that environmental law.136 Considering it fundamental to 
delivering a ‘Green Brexit’, the UK Government intends that the new watchdog’s central role will be 
                                                          
130 E.g. UKELA, n.88. 
131 However, in July 2018 a high-level workshop was hosted at Queen’s University Belfast, which brought together around 50 
stakeholders to debate the future of environmental governance in Northern Ireland. This workshop resulted in a policy paper 
(n.15) and submission to the DEFRA consultation on environmental governance and principles, available at 
https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2018/08/Brennan-Dobbs-Gravey-Ui-Bhroin-
submission-to-DEFRA-Environmental-Governance-Consultation.pdf. 
132 E.g. via the consultation relating to the Northern Ireland Future Agricultural Policy Framework, https://www.daera-
ni.gov.uk/consultations/northern-ireland-future-agricultural-policy-framework and (n 32). 
133  B. Moore, ‘Environmental principles and governance: Brexit and Environment’s key messages’ (2018) 
https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/2018/08/14/environmental-principles-governance-brexit-environments-key-messages/  
134 European Commission, n.16. 
135 C. Baynes, ‘Government to set up environmental watchdog to deliver ‘green Brexit’, says Michael Gove’, (Independent, 
12th November 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/michael-gove-environment-secretary-green-brexit-
andrew-marr-show-european-union-a8050626.html. 
136 EUWA s16(1)(d). 
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to: provide independent scrutiny/advice relating to environmental law and policy; respond to complaints 
surrounding the delivery/implementation of environmental law; and hold Government publicly 
accountable where its implementation of environmental law has failed, exercising enforcement powers 
where necessary.137 Ultimately, the Government explicitly intends that this authority will replace the 
functions of the European Commission and CJEU (although it will not act as a court). However, as 
more detail on post-Brexit plans have emerged in the draft Environment Bill, issues arise in terms of 
the territorial extent of the proposed OEP, its ‘independent’ nature and the scope of its remit and powers.  
Although initially unclear as to the extent to which the proposed watchdog might operate with regards 
to the devolved governments, the draft Environment Bill and accompanying documents provided 
further detail.138 In the first instance, the UK Government’s direct responsibilities extend only to 
England and to ‘reserved matters’, which vary slightly under the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland 
devolution settlements.139 By extension this therefore establishes the initial limits of the proposed OEP’s 
responsibilities. Although the UK government has thus been careful to avoid ‘stepping on the toes’ of 
the devolved administrations who have had jurisdiction over most environmental matters for over 
twenty years, the often cross-cutting nature of environmental considerations means that (as discussed 
above in the context of common frameworks) there is likely to be a need for some centralised 
enforcement and accountability mechanisms to replace the controls currently provided by the EU. As 
certain cross-cutting issues will clearly move beyond reserved matters and into the realms of devolved 
responsibilities this has already become a politically contentious matter.140 While the UK government 
has committed to exploring ways in which final proposals can be co-designed with the devolved 
governments,141 this has the potential to be extremely challenging – particularly with regard to the 
establishment of an overarching enforcement authority. Reid has pointed out that the divergent starting 
points in terms of environmental governance planning in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland mean that the emergence of ‘any collaborative and co-designed structure for the UK as a whole’ 
is unlikely in the near future.142 It is difficult to imagine how a process involving ‘co-design’ could 
operate in Northern Ireland given the seemingly intractable political deadlock currently preventing 
restoration of the devolved government.  
                                                          
137 DEFRA, n.31. 
138 Draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill, (n 98) 
139 Draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill 2018, Explanatory Notes, 39. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766849/draft-
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140 Reid, n.78. 
141 C. Reid, All in it together – but not yet? Devolution in the Environment Bill (2019) 
https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/2019/01/20/devolution-in-the-environment-bill/ 
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environmental protection below those in place at the end of the implementation period’, 
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The proposed ‘independent’ nature of the OEP has also met with some scepticism, rooted in part in 
concerns surrounding the erosion of the funding and independence of existing environmental oversight 
bodies such as Natural England and the Environment Agency in England and the perceived inability of 
these agencies to carry out their remit fully due to this erosion.143 Meanwhile, as noted above, criticism 
of Northern Ireland’s current arrangements for delivering environmental regulation have for decades 
coalesced around the NIEA’s lack of independence and consequent problems that this arrangement has 
created.144 These considerations must be taken into account in the nature and design of any future 
accountability mechanisms to ensure credibility. Given the extremely turbulent political context in 
Northern Ireland, the need for an environmental regulator at arms-length from the devolved government 
is now arguably even more crucial. This need has intensified given that some proposed legislative 
changes post-Brexit could confer enhanced powers on Northern Ireland’s DAERA and in the process 
both create and exacerbate conflicts of interest.145 More complex questions about accountability and the 
need for urgent reforms to the structure of Northern Ireland’s existing governance structures, (regardless 
of the development of a new watchdog) clearly emerge when the prospect of a return to direct rule from 
Westminster in the continued absence of a devolved government is considered. This is now a very real 
possibility given the complete collapse of relations between Northern Ireland’s main political parties 
amid increasing acrimony relating to Brexit and the ‘backstop’.146 
The new body’s remit and powers have also been the subject of criticism, with significant concern 
surrounding the watchdog’s role as set out in DEFRA’s consultation document and subsequent 
publications.147  These proposals appeared to fall far short of the UK Government’s promises to replace 
the EU enforcement mechanisms with a body ‘with real bite’,148 essentially because the enforcement 
powers which the government has proposed to grant to the new body appear to be wholly insufficient. 
In particular, criticism has been directed towards the lack of any provision to levy fines and a lack of 
clarity surrounding the ability to take legal action against the government if it failed to implement 
environmental standards.149 This has prompted concerns that a failure to establish a watchdog with 
meaningful enforcement powers could therefore create a very substantial gap between what EU 
                                                          
143 House of Lords Select Committee on the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006 ‘The countryside at a 
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145 For example, The Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 grant 
additional powers to DAERA NI as the final arbiter in the interpretation of the Regulation and in determining overriding public 
interest in approving planning applications for projects which will have an adverse effect on protected Habitats. The effect of 
this change would be to enshrine absolute power in one body which has a demonstrably problematic record of delivering 
effective habitat protection, see Brennan et al n 3. 
146 E.g. DUP and Sinn Fein blame each other as power-sharing impasse milestone reached (Belfast Telegraph, 28 August 2018) 
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/dup-and-sinn-fein-blame-each-other-as-powersharing-impasse-
milestone-reached-37260805.html 
147 DEFRA, n.31. 
148 Baynes, n.135. 
149 A. Jordan & B. Moore, ‘Could fines be the green watchdog’s sharpest teeth?’, Brexit and Environment, 12th July 2018,  
https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/2018/07/12/fines-green-watchdogs-sharpest-teeth. 
28 
 
membership currently delivers (i.e. the ability of the European Commission to take legal action against 
non-compliant Member States before the CJEU) and what could emerge post-Brexit.150 However, the 
Draft Withdrawal Agreement demonstrates a willingness from at least part of the current UK 
government to agree to imbue a watchdog (operating at a UK-wide level) with more substantial powers 
e.g. the ability to conduct inquiries, the power to request information and, importantly, the right to 
initiate legal actions before the courts.151 Despite these assurances, the draft Environment Bill published 
late in 2018 assuages concerns to only a limited extent.152 Lee has highlighted the particularly restrictive 
threshold created by the fact that in the current draft, even non-binding ‘enforcement’ action can only 
be instigated in response to a ‘serious’ ‘failure to comply’ with ‘environmental law’, in addition to the 
continued absence of the ability for the OEP to issue legally binding decisions.153. Given the difficulties 
in achieving compliance in Northern Ireland (both at an internal domestic level and with overarching 
EU standards more generally), there is a clear need for any kind of oversight body with UK-wide 
jurisdiction, or that might potentially be at least extended in the interim to Northern Ireland, to have 
very robust enforcement powers to ensure Northern Ireland’s devolved government and regulatory 
bodies are held to account for any failure to achieve compliance and uphold standards. This requirement 
must however be balanced against the potential for increased internal UK political discord as a result 
of threats of enforcement action from a UK-wide body such as the OEP against the devolved 
governments.  
The second key strand of DEFRA’s proposal revolves around the possibility of judicial review playing 
an enhanced role in holding government decision-makers to account with regards to environmental 
decision-making. However, three inter-linked problems with relying on the ordinary judicial review 
process to replace the EU accountability mechanisms must be considered. Firstly, the potentially 
prohibitive costs associated with bringing a judicial review continue to fall short of the UK’s obligations 
under the Aarhus Convention (of which the UK will remain a signatory post-Brexit)154 and exist in 
sharp contrast to the EU citizen complaint procedure that allows anyone to alert the European 
Commission to a possible infringement free of charge.155 Although the UK government has reported 
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some progress towards addressing this compliance deficit,156 concerns remain surrounding a range of 
issues associated with the current costs regime in England and Wales, as well as in Scotland.157 In 
Northern Ireland, some helpful reforms to the Environmental Costs Protection Regime158 have occurred 
in recent years following consultation by the Northern Ireland Department of Justice and this may pave 
the way for more extensive use of this avenue by NGOs and activists. 159 This increased reliance on 
judicial review as a means of challenging environmental decision-making is a process that has already 
begun in Northern Ireland, through a recent series of high profile judicial reviews pursued by individual 
activists supported by Friends of the Earth Northern Ireland.160 This is arguably a strategy developed in 
direct response to the accountability vacuum that has developed over decades and in particular since 
the collapse of the devolved government. However, despite the increase in environmental judicial 
reviews being brought before the courts in Northern Ireland, NGOs continue to express significant 
concerns relating to issues surrounding reciprocal caps, the exclusion of private law cases and 
prohibitively expensive own costs.161 Therefore, the costs implications and the consequent financial 
pressure that a future reliance on judicial review may place on personal litigants and environmental 
pressure groups clearly have the potential to create a financially inaccessible system.162 The omission 
of the Aarhus requirement that public access to environmental justice should not be ‘prohibitively 
expensive’ from the Draft Withdrawal Agreement and the EUWA is therefore highly significant for all 
parts of the UK.163 
A second issue with judicial review relates to its unsuitability in terms of resolving issues through 
discussion and negotiation, which has to-date been an important arbitration function of the European 
Commission’s role.164 This is connected to the idea that there is a judicial reluctance to interfere in 
environmental decision-making as a result of ‘the dynamics between the ‘political’ nature of 
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environmental law and the legal focus of judicial review’.165 In the EU system, CJEU preliminary 
references are useful because the CJEU was not concerned with whether its judgments were considered 
contrary to government policy or not and it was obliged to answer the specific questions referred. There 
is a risk post-Brexit that domestic courts may avoid deeply scrutinising environmental decision-making 
because it is considered to be too political in nature. This reticence may be particularly problematic 
regarding controversial Northern Irish issues – as demonstrated in a range of other areas in the past.166 
This reticence would be further heightened due to the general approach to the standard of review in 
judicial review cases. It is well-established that whilst the UK courts will examine and control 
procedural elements relatively strictly, when it comes to substantive judicial review (or review of the 
merits) the courts are considerably more reluctant to probe in too much detail.167 Due to a combination 
of recognising the expertise of regulators and other decision-makers, as well as respecting the separation 
of powers and the administrative arm of the State, the courts only undertake limited substantive review 
as highlighted by the Wednesdbury line of cases.168 This is to the point that only decisions that are 
‘egregiously unreasonable’ are likely to be overturned on the substance of the decision.169 This is 
currently the subject of a complaint under the Aarhus Convention, as failing to meet the requirements 
of access to justice.170  
In addition, although environmental principles are clearly justiciable in both a UK and EU context (as 
discussed above), the inclusion of a commitment to develop a policy statement to aid interpretation of 
principles post-Brexit could indicate an attempt on the part of government to limit the potential scope 
of subsequent judicial interpretation of principles.171 This limitation could stymie the ability of the 
courts to develop a body of, what Pedersen describes as a unique ‘UK environmental principles 
jurisprudence’.172 Finally, recent research has found that the courts find against claimants challenging 
administrative environmental law decisions by a higher margin than in other areas of administrative 
law, albeit with variations dependent on the court and the public authority being challenged.173 This 
issue should also be borne in mind when considering the degree to which judicial review can ultimately 
‘plug’ the accountability gap in the environmental context.  
5. Conclusion 
This article has focussed on the significance of Northern Ireland’s vulnerabilities in the context of 
environmental governance, and how these have been amplified by Brexit. The formal UK-EU Brexit 
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negotiations started when UK Prime Minister May triggered Article 50 in March 2017 – two months 
after the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive. Northern Ireland thus now finds itself in a 
‘paradoxical’ situation – on the one hand occupying a focal point in Brexit negotiations dominated by 
talks of borders and backstops,174 but remaining underrepresented in domestic discussions about 
governance after Brexit and with senior civil servants now making decisions in lieu of Ministers.175 
Without an operational Executive, Northern Ireland cannot itself undertake urgently needed reforms, 
develop policy or push for either its own solutions or tailored versions of English or UK-wide proposals 
for environmental governance post-Brexit.176 The result is unprecedented policy stagnation, a worrying 
lack of preparedness for Brexit and a highly unbalanced and unsustainable reliance on the civil service. 
In the absence of a devolved government, responding to these distinctive vulnerabilities should now be 
a priority for both the UK and Irish governments – both of whom have substantial (albeit 
underappreciated) vested interests in preventing the further degradation of Northern Ireland’s 
environment. The draft Withdrawal Agreement appears to indicate that both the European Union and 
the UK support a Green Brexit177 and recognise the need for better environmental governance in 
Northern Ireland. Hence, Annex 4, Part 2 calls for both non-regression (Article 2) and the establishment 
of a UK-wide body, or bodies for the ‘monitoring and enforcement of environmental protection’.178 
However, these proposals are insufficient for Northern Ireland in terms of either rectifying existing 
environmental governance deficits or indeed addressing the potentially significant governance gaps 
posed by Brexit. Similarly, the Environment Bill does not go far enough, either for England or for the 
rest of the UK and particularly not for Northern Ireland. As outlined above, Northern Ireland has need 
for a range of varied common collaborative frameworks within the UK and also with the Republic of 
Ireland. An Environmental Charter for Northern Ireland incorporating binding environmental precepts 
to drive policy and law-making and guide purposive interpretation could help ensure standards are 
maintained post-Brexit. Regardless of the nature of the legal and policy instruments which may emerge 
post-Brexit, it is essential that these are implemented and enforced through effective, independent 
monitoring bodies with robust powers to ensure accountability and compliance. The obvious challenge 
however is how to achieve such reform in the current political context. Despite the extra powers 
temporarily granted to Northern Ireland civil servants in late 2018, they do not have the legal capacity 
or political legitimacy to initiate any major innovations in this context. Ultimately, either a reconstituted 
Northern Ireland government will be required to instigate these reforms or Westminster will need to act 
more directly on Northern Ireland’s behalf. Neither of these options seems likely at the time of writing. 
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Consequently, meaningful environmental governance reform is currently ‘on ice’ unless, and until, the 
seismic political shifts enveloping Northern Ireland, the UK and the EU result in a more stable, but 
drastically altered political (and possibly constitutional) reality. Ironically, if such reforms were to take 
place, it would be a small but significant step that could facilitate current Brexit negotiations and help 
mitigate the possible consequences for environmental governance in the absence of political will or 
powers in the future. 
 
